From: Jason Neyers <jneyers@uwo.ca>
To: obligations@uwo.ca
Date: 01/03/2014 15:52:03 UTC
Subject: Re: ODG: UKSC on Nuisance

Dear Colleagues:

I can't accept that the US rule is correct either.  Apart from the extortion fact pattern (which relies on a different--gratuitous harm--principle), I do not see how your use of your land can dictate the uses to which I can put mine, that is expropriation.  Each of us is protected by the law of nuisance from substantial interferences, so if the manufacturing makes it so that no one could sleep on my property then it is a nuisance even in an industrial area and even if the industry was there first.  I know that Richard thinks that the law is based on equal freedom and this seems to be the only rule that respects that. I note that this is Beever's position as well in his monograph cited by the UKSC (at pages 30-31; 65-67).  I would also suggest that the best interpretation of the live and let live rule is somewhat narrower than has been suggested. Given the situations that are originally given as examples in Bamford (emptying cesspools, making repairs, burning weeds), the principle seems to deal with situations where the interference could be argued to be substantial but where there is an element of reciprocity in that I as a neighbor will one day have to  make the same or similar repairs, install a pool (to use a modern example), etc in the future.  These things therefore are not nuisances if they are conveniently done (and the character of the neighborhood helps us to determine the nature of these acts).

I would also point out that, under the influence of economic analysis, people have come to view these situations (Factory vs Sleep) as situations of reciprocal harm but from the legal prespective this cannot be true (unless me suing you for battery is a situation of reciprocal harm).  Only the factory is emitting things (particles, waves, etc) that enter into my property, my sleeping is not invading the property of the factory.  There is a real asymmetry here that is forgotten if we just look at competing uses.  

Cheers,
Jason Neyers
Professor of Law
Faculty of Law
Western University
N6A 3K7
(519) 661-2111 x. 88435 
On 28/02/2014 12:57 PM, Wright, Richard wrote:
I was not indicating agreement with everything said in every opinion, all of which admit being contemplative rather than prescriptive on many of the issues.  For example, I too do not agree that coming to the nuisance should be an available defense merely because the claimant seeks to change the use of its land from some prior use.  I have always especially disliked Denning's opinion on this and on what constitutes a "reasonable use" in Jackson v. Miller.  This would make no sense at all for previously undeveloped land.  Rather, the coming to the nuisance defense should be allowed, as in the USA, only if the claimant's use is one entirely inappropriate given the existing character of the area (e.g., an attempt to build a residence [and then sue for a nuisance] in the midst of a district dedicated to manufacturing etc. or if (as one of the judges noted) the claimant moved to the locale and claimed a nuisance solely for the purpose of extorting money from the defendant.  The character of the land is and should be determinative, as Jason seems to admit, under the "give and take"/"live and let live" rule: what is necessary for people to live and do what is normal in this area given the character of the locale (city v wilderness, manufacturing v residential, etc.) and thus not a nuisance, and what is not necessary given the character of the locale and furthermore constitutes a substantial interference with uses that are proper given the character of the locale.  What I am happy to see the court put down is the unfortunate but understandable inclination of some writers to interpret "reasonable user" instead as a negligence analysis focused on the defendant's conduct or activity, with resort even to a Hand formula cost-benefit analysis.

On Fri, Feb 28, 2014 at 11:03 AM, Jason Neyers <jneyers@uwo.ca> wrote:
Dear Colleagues:

Having just read the decision, I can agree with Phillip that it is important but cannot agree with Richard that it is useful. I think that on almost every issue (except the issue of prescription) the court gets the law wrong in the sense that the answers given do not fit with the most coherent understanding of the law of nuisance to be gleaned from the cases.  For example, the court seems to treat the issue of the character of the area as some sort of trump card, ie if you prove it fits the character then there cannot be a nuisance whereas the better understandable is that the character of the area is merely the context in which one: (1) decides whether the interference was substantial and hence unreasonable; (2) does a analysis of necessary acts conveniently done/give and take between neighbors. Similarly, coming to the nuisance is now a defence if the claimant seeks to change the uses of their land  [ 56] which allows defendants to effectively expropriate others land uses without compensation and without having gained an prescriptive easement through 20 years use---this despite earlier claims that such a concept was a "old notion ... long since exploded". Moreover, this is seemingly done to give content/save from scourn a dissent of Denning! Finally, the court effectively overules Shelfer and states that public interest is a very important issue that is to be addressed by the judge in deciding to issue an injunction despite the fact that, as some of their Lordships point out, judges will not often have the available evidence and despite the fact that their is a defence of statutory authority which exists to protect the public interest (and a well understood doctrine of injurious affection to make compensation to the public following on from that).  Moreover, trial judges are given no metric as to how to balance interests and rights.  Are ten  peoples jobs worth one private right? Are football matches?  If this is the law, then defendants are better off not pleading statutory authority and better just pleading public interest in most cases.

As I jokingly mentioned to a colleague, I will enjoy heaping scorn on Lord Neuberger and his "have his cake and eat it too" judgment in Coventry where everything is relevant at at least some of the time on some point in the nuisance analysis.  Can anything not be relevant anymore?

Sincerely,
Jason